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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
sion affirmed judgment for defendant."" Whether this one-sided ratio
is indicative of district court cases not appealed is mere speculation,
but the futility in appealing a decision is readily apparent. With-
out the aid of blood tests any attempt to refute a bastardy charge
in court is so difficult that an out-of-court settlement is often more
advantageous, both to the defendant's finances and his reputation.
Certainly the infrequency of bastardy proceedings in North Dakota
does not justify judicial and legislative inertia. The defendant in a
bastardy action should not be denied the right to submit compe-
tent scientific evidence in his defense. To effect a remedy the Leg-
islature should pass the Uniform Act in toto.
WILLIAM E. PORTER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEPARATION OF POWERS - CURRENT
PROPOSALS TO LIMIT INTERNATIONAL COMPACTS BY THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT.-The American Bar Association recently
recommended to the Congress the adoption of a constitutional
amendment to the effect that treaties could become effective as
internal law "only through legislation by Congress which ft could
enact under its delegated powers in the absence of such treaty."'
Designed, according to its sponsors, to ward off the danger that
basic constitutional principles might be subverted by the use of
the federal government's treaty-making powers, the proposal has
provoked wide-spread controversy. Its opponents charge that it
amounts to a drastic curtailment of the federal government's free-
dom of action on the international scene, and that it is unnecessary
in view of well-settled principles of constitutional law.
Following the meeting at which this resolution was passed, the
ABA's Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United
Nations took up the study of executive agreements. The Commit-
tee has since proposed that the American Bar Association recom-
mend to Congress the following amendment to the Constitution:
N.D. 316, 216 N.W. 576 (1927); State v. Luithle, 57 N.D. 316, 221 N.W. 885 (1928);
State v. Anderson, 58 N.D. 721, 227 N.W. 220 (1929); State v. Rudy, 62 N.D. 403,
244 N.W. 28 (1932); State v. Hollinger, 69 N.D. 363, 287 N.W. 225 (1939).
81. State v. Burnette, 28 N.D. 539, 150 N.W. 271 (1914), State v. Sibla, 46
N.D. 337, 179 N.W. 656 (1920); State v. Weber, 49 N.D. 325, 191 N.W. 610 (1922);
State v. Kvenmoen, 60 N.D. 60, 232 N.W. 475 (1930); Weisser v. Preszler, 62 N.D. 75,
241 N.W. 505 (1932); State v. Muldoon, 64 N.D. 564, 254 N.W. 475 (1934).
82. State v. McKnight, 7 N.D. 444, 75 N.W. 790 (1898).
1. The full text of the proposed amendment is as follows: "A provision of a
treaty which conflicts with. any provision of this Constitution shall not be of any force
or effect. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the Unitied States only
through legislation by Congress which it could enact under its delegated powers in
the absence of such treaty." 76 A.B.A. Rep. 7 (1952.) (Report of Standing Commit-
tee on Peace and Law Through United Nations).
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"Executive agreements shall not be made in lieu of treaties.
Congress shall have power to enforce this provision by ap-
propriate legislation. Nothing herein shall be construed to
restrict the existing power of Congress to regulate executive
agreements under the provisions of this Constitution." 2
Earlier last year, two similar resolutions were presented to
Congress. Senator McCarran of Nevada introduced S. J. Res. 122 :'
and Senator Bricker of Ohio introduced S. J. Res. 130.4 Both had
the objective of curbing treaties and executive agreements, though
by different methods. Senator McCarran would do so by legisla-
tion, while Senator Bricker's resolution called for contitutional
amendment.'
In the light of these proposals, all of which have received
some degree of public discussion in the press and elsewhere, it
would seem desirable to examine the historical basis of the United
States government's powers in the field of foreign affairs and the
manner in which they have been exercised. For the immediate
purposes of this discussion, a treaty may be defined as an inter-
national act a)proved by two-thirds of the Senate; all other inter-
national compacts of the United States are considered "executive
agreements.""
Because the Constitution of the United States provides that
treaties-together with the Constitution itself and the laws made
pursuant to it-are the "supreme law of the land," 7 the view has
often been expressed that there is a considerable danger that vari-
ous fundamental liberties might be subverted through the use of
treaties which would override the Federal Constitution, state con-
stitutions, state laws and federal statutes.8 Indeed, the possibility
that a treaty could be used to overturn some of the provisions of
the Federal Constitution became involved in the last presidential
2. Id. at 14.
3. 98 Cong. Rec. 301 (Jan. 21, 1952).
4. 98 Cong. Ree..920 (Feb. 7, 1952).
5. Either or. both of these methods could be conceivably employed. Passing
a statute would be effective at once, so far as the problem is susceptible of statutory
treatment; Senator Bricker's proposed constitutional. amendment would then remove
any conceivable doubt..
6. McClure, International Executive Agreements 3 (.1941).
7. U.S. Const., Art. VI, §2.
8. Deutsch, The Treaty -Making clause: A Decision fo the People of America,
:37 A.B,A,J, 659 (1951); Fleming, Danger to America: The Draft. Covenant on Human
Rights. 37 A.B.A.J. 739 (1951); Ober. The Treaty-Making and Amending Powers:
Do They Protect Our Fundamental Rights?, 36 A.B.A.J. 715 (1950); Holman, Treaty
Law-Making: A Blank Check for Writing a New Constitution, 36 A.B.A.J. 707 (1950).
Opposing the proposed restrictions are Sutherland, Restricting the Treaty Power, 65
Harv. L. -Rev. 1305 (1952); Note, 19 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.* 422 (1951); Wright,
The Constitutionality of Treaties, 13 Am. J. Int. L. 242 (1919) (dealing with. previous
proposals of the same type).
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election. The immediate inspiration for much of the discussion is
the well-known case of Missouri v. Holland 10 -a decision which
has been bitterly assailed and, conversely, warmly defended.-
The case arose from the efforts of the Federal Government to
protect the migratory waterfowl of the nation from extermination
at the hands of hunters. Since control of wild life had historically
been vested in the states,'12 federal statutes proved ineffective.,.;
A treaty was then entered into between the United States and
Great Britain for the protection of the birds, and Congress pro-
ceeded to enact legislation specifying uniform hunting seasons.
When the right of the Federal Government thus to do by indirec-
tion what it could not do directly was challenged by the State of
Missouri, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the
supremacy of the federal statute passed pursuant to the treaty.'"
Despite the furor it created among those who thought that the
Tenth Amendment 1 had been violated, Missouri v. Holland can
scarcely be termed precedent-shattering. In fact, precisely the
same point of view had been adopted as early as 1796. The treaty
of 1783 by which the War of Independence was concluded pro-
vided for the restoration of all lands and the payment of all debts
owed to British citizens after the American Revolution." How-
ever, the State of Virginia, during the Revolution, had passed
legislation providing that all debts owed British citizens would be
discharged by payment to the State. Many debtors who thought
they had thus settled their accounts were understandably indig-
9. Thus, in a political broadcast Mr. Clarence Manion, former Dean of the College
of Law, University of Notre Dame, expressed the position of the proponents of the
restrictions on the treaty power as follows: "In that list of treaties there are provi-
sions which affect your right to practice religion, things which affect the freedom of
the press, which affect your right to hold property, things which affect the rights
of labor to organize and of management to meet with employees and to discuss with
them the problems of their industry - all these things to be established by treaty lam-
in spite of the determination of Congress, and in spite of the determination of the
States . . ." Manion, Radio Address at South Bend, Indiana, October 31, 1952.
10. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
11. Compare Black, Missouri v. Holland - A Judicial Milepost on the Road to
Absolutism, 25 11. L. Rev. 911 (1931), with Wright, supra note 8, written a year
before Missouri o. Holland was decided.
12. Geer v. Connecticut, 16 U.S. 519 (1896); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed Cas.
546, No. 3, 230 (E.D.Pa. 1823). See Note, 26 N.D. Bar Briefs 274 (1950).
13. United States v. Shauver, 214 Fed. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914), app. dismissed.
248 U.S. 594 (1919); United States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288 (D.Kan. 1915);
State v. McCullagh, 96 Kan. 786, 153 Pac. 557 (1915); State v. Sawyer, 113 Me.
458, 94 At. 886 (1915).
14. "No doubt the great body of private relations usually fall within the control
of the state, but a treaty may override its power." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416.
434 (1920).
15. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. Const., Amend. X.
16. 8 State. 80 (1783).
NOTES
nant when the British creditors presented bills which the Ameri-
cans felt had already been satisfied. However, in Ware v. Hylton 17
the United States Supreme Court held that the provisions of the
treaty effectively superseded the state law on the subject.
The implications which it is possible-though not necessary-
to draw from the knowledge that "treaties. . . . are as binding
within the territorial limits of the States as they are elsewhere
throughout the dominion of the United States," 1" has caused a
growing uneasiness among those persons who consider themselves
defenders of the rights of the states as opposed to the Federal
Government. These fears were given added impetus last year by
the fact that much of the government's position in the so-called
Steel Seizure case 1g--which involved the power of the President
to seize industrial plants important to the defense effort which
were threatened with labor shutdowns-was based upon analogies
drawn from precedents involving the foreign relations of the
United States.
If it is possible to draw worrisome implications as to prossible
future changes in internal law from the potential scope of the
treaty powers-which appear to be simply coextensive with the
needs of the nation dealing as an equal with other sovereigns 20 __
it is possible to point to even more far-reaching potentialities with
respect to executive agreements. Treaties, at least, are subject to
a constitutional check and balance. They must secure the approval
of two-thirds of the Senate. But executive agreements do not
legally require Congressional approval, though a large majority of
them have been submitted to Congress and ratified by simple
majorities of both houses. It has been pointed out that "In scores
of cases-some of them involving policy of prime importance to
the nation-(the president) has acted solely on his own initiative
as well as on his own responsibility." 21 Nor is there any clear dis-
tinction between what subjects are appropriate for the use of ex-
ecutive agreements and what matters ought to be handled through
treaties.
As in the case of the doctrine that the treaty power can be
used to override state laws, the executive agreement stems from
17. 3 U.S. 199, 244 (1796). "Our Federal Constitution establishes the power
of a treaty over the Constitution and laws of any of the states; and I have shown that
the words of the Fourth Article were intended, and are sufficient, to nullify the law
of Virginia and the payment under it."
18. Baldwin v, Franks, '120 U.S. 678, 683 (1886).
19. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
20. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924); United States v. Curtiss
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
21. McClure, International Executive Agreements 3 (1941).
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the early days of the nation's history. Benjamin Franklin nego-
tiated an executive agreement modifying an existing treaty with
France in 1784,22 while Timothy Pickering, Postmaster General
tinder Washington, used the device of the executive agreement in
arranging for the interchange of mail with Canada. To this day,
about two-sevenths of all executive agreements are bipartite postal
arrangements. :1 By far the most famous of the early executive
agreements was that between the United States and Great Britain
regarding limitation of armament on the Great Lakes.2 4 Although
Louisiana, Florida, the Gadsden Purchase, Alaska and the Virgin
Islands were acquired by treaty, Texas and Hawaii were absorbed
by executive agreement." Texas, for example, was absorbed as a
state although the treaty of annexation failed to pass the Senate.
26
A famous instance of the use of the executive agreement oc-
curred during the administration of Theodore Roosevelt. The
financial breakdown of the Dominican Republic had caused
threats of European intervention. When the Senate refused to
ratify a treaty which Roosevelt submitted to it for the purpose of
allowing the United States to intervene effectively in the situation,
Roosevelt accomplished the same purpose through the use of an
executive agreement.2 , Two years later a treaty was ratified put-
ting an end to his fears that the agreement would not survive his
term of office.21
The history of World War I is replete with bipartite agree-
ments made by the United States.21 Similarly, a preview of World
War II was provided by the agreement reached in 1940 with
Great Britain for the lease of certain bases to the United States in
return for fifty destroyers,30 and the agreements made toward the
close of the conflict remain a subject of considerable political con-
troversy even today.
This brief discussion of the role of the executive agreement
should be sufficient to suggest that, in comparison to the device of
22. 2 Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States 185 (1931).
23. McClure, International Executive Agreements 5 (1941).
24. McClure, op cit. supra note 23, at 18.
25. Id. at 13.
26. Id. at 62.
27. Id. at 30.
28. Roosevelt, An Autobiography 553 (1913).
29. The first Liberty Loan Act on April 24, 1917, provided for American purchase
of Allied government obligations with a view to establishing credits. All told, war
and reconstruction loans reached a sum of about nine and one-half billions of dollars.
When peace treaties with Austria, Germany and Hungary failed to get the necessary
approval, Congress adopted a joint resolution declaring the war at an end. Debt
settlement agreements following the war were ratified by Congress. The vote in the
case of Italy was sufficiently close, 54-33, to have prevented a two-thirds ratification
of a treaty. McClure, op. cit. supra note 23, at 118.
30. 54 Stat. 2405 (1940) (executive agreement).
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the treaty, the executive agreement is by far the more important
medium available to the United States government for the making
of international compacts. This situation - carrying with it the
corollary of decreased Congressional participation in the handling
of foreign affairs-has not passed unnoticed by the Congress.
Thus, Senator Robert A. Taft remarked in 1942, "As a matter of
fact, no treaties of any importance have been submitted to the
Senate since I have been a member of the body." 1, And the late
Professor Borchard, in 1944, said that, "If the Senate waives its
treaty prerogatives long enough in the face of a continuing Presi-
dential determination to make compacts with foreign countries by
executive agreements, the Senate may, by such default, lose its
constitutional prerogatives altogether," : '
Despite these criticisms of current procedure, however, it may
be doubted that the trend toward the increased use of the execu-
tive agreement rather than the treaty will be reversed in the fu-
ture.: 3 A pragmatic reason may be suggested: That experience in
the past has proved that the use of the treaty method too often
tends to involve the international relations of the United States in
the vagaries of internal politics, with sometimes disastrous re-
sults."4 This suggests that in the future, the courts, in their con-
sideration of the legal problems involved in the use of such agree-
ments, will probably be motivated by the influences suggested by
Mr. Justice Holmes. "The very considerations which judges most
rarely mention, and always with an apology, are the secret root
form which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of course,
considerations of what is expedient for the community concern-
ed:" 11 This process has long since been carried to the point where
the executive agreement has attained a respectable legal position.
"To doubt their validity in law at this day would be almost as
futile as to doubt their existence in fact." -16
The precise effect of the executive agreements as compared
with a treaty has also caused discussion. It has been argued that
both have precisely the same force. Thus, McClure states that
"The President can do by executive agreement anything that he
can do by treaty, providing Congress by law cooperates. And
31. 98 Cong. Reec. 9276 (1942).
32. Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 Yale
L.J. 677 (1944).
33. McClure estimates that the United States entered into 1200 executive agree-
ments from 1789 to 1939. During the same period about 800 treaties were put in
force.
34. E.g., the Treaty of Versailles, following World War I.
35. Holmes, The Common Law 35 (1881).
36. McClure, International Executive Agreements 189 (1941).
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there is a very wide field of action in which the cooperation of
Congress is not necessary; indeed, where Congress possesses no
constitutional authority to dissent." - On the other hand, a careful
study has reached the following conclusions:
"From the point of view of international law, treaties and ex-
ecutive agreements are alike in that both constitute equally bind-
ing obligations upon the nation. From the point of view of our
constitutional law, however, there are important differences of
substance as well as of form. Treaties may be negotiated which
depart widely from our existing laws or policies, and the Senate
in approving their ratification is subject to no restraint or consid-
eration within the general limits of the treaty-making power under
our form of government other than what is best for our nation.
But the President in making executive agreements has no such free
hand. He must act scrupulously within the laws and conform to
the policies already established by the Congress." 38
The international compacts presently in use by the United
States have been divided into five distinct categories: 39
1. Treaties, that is, agreements to which two-thirds of the
Senators give "advice and consent." These are never referred to
the House of Representatives.
2. Congressional-Executive agreements, that is, agreements
negotiated by the Executive with the authority of both houses of
Congress. A simple majority is adequate.
3. Agreements made pursuant to authority conferred in an
existing treaty and agreements in effectuation of a policy enunci-
ated in a treaty.
4. Presidential Agreements, that is, agreements made by the
President in his capacity as the "sole organ of the nation in its ex-
ternal relations and its sole representative with foreign nations." 40
5. Agreements made by the President pursuant to overlapping
authority, that is, where Congress authorizes the President to enter
into an agreement dealing with a question which under the Con-
stitution is also subject to independent Presidential control.
It is the fourth classification, above, which has generated the
most controversy because of the extensive nature of the powers
37. McClure, op. cit. supra, at 363. And see McDougal and Lans, Treaties and
Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of
National Policy, 54 Yale L.J. 199, 201 (1945). "There is no difference between
treaties and agreements aside from the method used in obtaining them."
38. Sayre, The Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act, 39 Col L. Rev.
751, 755 (1939).
39. McDougal and Lans supra Note, 37, at 204 et seq.
40. This is a description of the Presidential function first used by John Marshall
while a member of the house of representatives. See note 39, supra.
NOTES
which the President is enabled to employ through the use of such
agreements. These have customarily been exercised by "strong"
Chief Executives in a vigorous manner, as witness Theodore Roo-
sevelt's agreement with the Dominican Republic,41 and Franklin
Delano Roosevelt's agreement to give the British fifty over age
destroys shortly before the United States became embroiled in
World War II. It should be pointed out, moreover, that such
agreements affect this country in other spheres than that of the
exclusively international. They are, in many instances, effective to
alter the internal rights of citizens despite state laws to the con-
trary. Thus, in the Litvinov Assignment cases,412 an exchange of
notes between President Franklin Roosevelt and Maxim M. Lit-
vinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, resulted in the
United States extension of de jure recognition to the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. One of the agreements entered into as
a condition to recognition assigned Russian property to the United
States in liquidation of claims held by this government against the
U.S.S.R. In the meantime, property belonging to a Russian in-
surance company which had been nationalized by the revolution-
ary government in Russia had been distributed in New York ac-
cording to that state's law. It was held that the de jure recognition
extended to the Russian government carried with it acceptance,
so far as this government was concerned, of the legality of the
Soviet decrees of confiscation; and since the Soviet rights had been
transferred to the United States government by the assignment, it
could take possession of the New York assets of the Russian firm
despite the fact that New York law was to the contrary.
4 3
As late as the time of Theodore Roosevelt, the feeling prevailed
that an executive agreement might not survive the term of an
incumbent president.14 At present, it is generally held that such
agreements are as enduring as treaties." Both the proposals of
Senator McCarran and Senator Bricker seek to limit the effective
duration of executive agreements to either six months or one year
after the term of the president who makes them expires, unless they
41. Roosevelt, An Autobiography 552 (1913).
42. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324 (1937).
43. "A treaty is the law of the land under the supremacy clause of. the Constitu-
tion. Such international compacts and agreements as the Litvinov assignment have a
similar dignity." United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942).
44. Roosevelt, An Autobiography 552 (1913).
45. "Indeed, confronted With the extent of the variety exhibited by even a very
few of the historical facts bearing upon the subject, one finds manifest difficulty in
contending that the Constitution, whether with respect to the authorized treaty-making
power or otherwise has set up exclusive directions regarding either the conclusion or
the dissolution of international acts, whether executive agreements or treaties." McClure,
International Executive Agreements 29 (1941).,
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are extended by the next administration. However, a former Soli-
citor General of the United States has said of these proposals:
"The provision. . . . that executive agreements would terminate,
unless extended, after the end of the term of the President within
whose tenure they were negotiated, would impose obvious and
crippling impediments to the effective negotiation of and ad-
herence to all sorts of executive agreements, frequently of an ad-
ministrative character, whose nature presupposes a relatively long
term." 11
Opinions as to the intrinsic worth of the proposals put forth to
limit the power of the American government in foreign affairs will,
of course, take varying positions. But it seems possible, neverthe-
less, to suggest a few conclusions with respect to them. The cus-
tomary justification urged for the adoption of the amendment pro-
viding that treaties should become effective as internal law "only
through legislation by Congress which it could enact under its
delegated powers in the absence of such treaty" is that in other
nations this is the course generally followed. It is certainly true
that few other nations make treaties effective as a portion of their
internal law without legislative action; in that respect, the United
States is unique. If, therefore, the proposed amendment were to
provide only that a treaty should not become effective as internal
law unless legislation implementing the treaty as such were there-
after enacted by Congress, it would have the effect of placing this
country on the same footing as many others. But it is to be noted
that the proposed amendment did not say that treaties were to be-
come effective as internal law "only through legislation by Con-
gress." Added to the foregoing clause is another of much more
far-reaching effect, not perceived until the section is carefully
analyzed: the legislation must be of a class which the Congress
"could enact under its delegated powers in the absence of such
treaty." If this proposal were to become law, it seems clear that
the ability of the United States to carry on successful international
negotiations would be seriously hampered. The United States can
scarcely hope to be able to bargain effectively for non-discrimina-
tory treatment of American nationals living in foreign nations, for
instance, unless it is able to offer to the foreign governments a
reciprocal guarantee with respect to foreign nationals living here.
But how could it do so if the protection it sought for American
citizens abroad was of a type Congress could not reciprocally fur-
nish to foreign nationals in this country because of its inability to
46. Perlman, On Amending the Treaty Power, 52 Col L. Rev. 868 (1952).
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exercise any but specifically delegated powers? 4 The proposal to
limit the treaty power seems clearly unsound.
The various proposals to curtail executive agreements may be
criticized on basically similar grounds. Almost from the beginning
of the nation's history, there has been a controversy over the scope
and nature of the authority vested in the executive department by
the Constitution. Theodore Roosevelt gave one view of the matter
a classic enunciation when lie stated his position to be "that it is
not only (the President's) right but his duty to do anything that
the needs of the nation (demand), unless such action (is) -forbid-
den by the Constitution or by the laws." 48 His successor took a
different view, arguing that, "The president can exercise no power
which cannot fairly and reasonably be traced to some specific
grant power, or justly implied and included within such grant
of power and necessary to its exercise. . . . There is no undefined
residuum of power which he can exercise because it seems to him
to be in the public interests." 11
Whatever the limits upon the president's powers in purely in-
ternal affairs, in the field of foreign affairs the power of the executive
is plenary, subject to subsequent approval in certain instances by
Congress. And it seems equally clear that it ought to be so. To
impose upon the government of the United States, enmeshed in
the web of the international community whether it wishes or not,
limitations upon its freedom of action in the field of foreign affairs
is to place the United States at a serious disadvantage in dealing
with foreign sovereigns which recognize no such restrictions upon
their own powers. In an atomic era, the need for quick and de-
cisive action is obvious. The present distribution of power speci-
fied in the Constitution has served well throughout the nation's
history. To change it now appears both unnecessary and unwise.
So long as the United States remains a democratic nation, the
ultimate remedy for any abuses of the power to conduct foreign
affairs will rest in the hands of the people.
GORDON THOMPSON
47. An illustration may clarify the point. In Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265
U.S. 332 (1924), the Supreme Court upheld the contention of a Japanese citizen
living in Seattle that under a treaty between the United States and Japan containing
a non-discrimination clause he was entitled to operate a pawnshop despite the argu-
ment of the City of Seattle that a municipal ordinance forbidding aliens to engage
in pawnbroking was an exercise of the police power which the Constitution reserves
to the States. Presumably if the proposed amendment to the treaty power were adopted,
the decision would necessarily go the other way as to similar cases in the future.
what chance would there then be of securing similar rights for American nationals
doing business in foreign countries?
48. Roosevelt, An Autobiography 388 (1913).
49. Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers 141 (1916).
